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Over the last decade, German multinationals created about two million jobs abroad with increasing foreign direct 
investment (FDI). While there are many reasons for firms to go multinational and probably just as many for Germany's 
high unemployment, this paper aims to investigate the relationship between domestic labour costs and foreign direct 
investment. We apply a theoretical model for an econometric analysis examining the determinants of FDI using panel 
data of German firms' foreign capital stocks in 22 countries between 1994 and 2003. Estimating elasticities, we find 
that while domestic wages do not significantly influence total FDI by German firms, they positively affect the FDI 
stock in countries where cheap labour is abundant. Thus, although Germany's high labour costs are not the sole driver 
of foreign direct investment, they may accelerate the outsourcing of German jobs. 
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Although economic literature brought forward a signi￿cant number of theories and com-
prehensive explanations for the emergence of foreign direct investment (FDI), models
rarely existed until the 1980s. Helpman (1984) presented a ￿rst general-equilibrium
model of foreign direct investment. In the model, the location of production plants
is the decision variable which is in￿uenced by relative country size and di￿erences in
relative factor endowments. Firm-speci￿c assets are assumend and production involves
a labour and a capital-intensive activity which may be separated geographically. How-
ever, as transport costs are neglected in the model, ￿rms will only choose to locate
each activity in one country until factor prices equalize. Furthermore, as the incentive
for FDI stems from di￿erences in relative factor prices and endowments, foreign direct
investment between countries similar in terms of factor prices and endowments may
not take place. Therefore, Helpman’s model can explain the existence of vertically inte-
grated ￿rms but fails to account for market-seeking FDI. At the same time, Markusen
developed a model for horizontal multinational corporations (see Markusen, 2002, p.
127). He focuses on ￿rm-level scale economies arising from the public good charac-
teristics of knowledge-based assets. Thus, he presents a motive for ￿rms conducting
the same activity in more than one country but excludes any explanations for vertical
specialization.
Evidence suggests that within multinational enterprises (MNEs) both, horizontal
and vertical FDI ￿ows, do exist1. Therefore, the need of a general equilibrium model
being able to explain both arose. According to Markusen (2002), market-seeking FDI
will take place between countries which are similar in terms of income and factor
prices and when transaction costs between these countries are relatively high, be it
due to trade barriers or transport costs. Resource- and e￿ciency-seeking FDI will
take place when trade costs are low and countries are asymmetric in terms of factor
prices (Mukherjee and Broll, 2007). If trade costs are low but factor prices equal, then
exporting will be more pro￿table than opening a foreign plant.
However, as good as the predictions of Markusen’s theory may be, due to its focus on
MNEs it requires micro-level data to estimate. Therefore, we will use a model brought
forward by Cushman (1987) as a foundation for the econometric analysis in this paper.
The paper is structured as follows. In section II we present the model, the empirical
analysis is discribed in section III and its results are displayed in section IV. The ￿nal
section o￿ers some concluding remarks.
1For a survey on multinational ￿rms, see Navaretti and Venables (2004).
2II Wage E￿ects on Foreign Direct Investment
Cushman’s model (1987) provides a suitable framework for investigating how labour
costs a￿ect FDI. It is assumed ￿rms decide whether to export from their home country
or to establish a local plant for production in the host country. The following assump-
tions are made: a ￿rm can produce in the home or foreign country to serve the foreign
market; there is only one good and two factors of production, capital and labour: out-
put of the good is a function of the two factors; the ￿rm has some price-setting power
(arising from a di￿erntiated product due to ￿rm-speci￿c assets), therefore the price in
the foreign market decreases when output (=o￿ered quantity) increases; the ￿rm has
decreasing returns to scale production technology in both plants; capital and labour
are not perfect substitutes meaning a change in the employment of one factor a￿ects
the other factors productivity.








∗]R − iPKK − WL , (1)
i.e. pro￿ts (Π) are a function of the foreign price of output P ∗, home country production
Q (equals exports) and foreign production Q∗, the domestic interest rate i, home and
foreign capital prices PK and P ∗
K∗, the home and foreign wage rates W and W ∗, the
real price of foreign currency R and home and foreign labour and capital inputs L and
L∗ and K and K∗ respectively. All variables are in real terms.
Firms maximize pro￿ts over factor inputs in the domestic and foreign plant. To
examine the e￿ects of changes in W and W ∗, we derive the ￿rst order conditions with
respect to L, K, L∗ and K∗. We obtain:
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with FX being the ￿rst derivative of F with respect to X and n∗ being a measure
for the price elasticity of demand in the foreign market.
Equations (2) to (5) represent a set of marginal revenue-marginal cost equalities.
For home production (equations (2) and (3)), the right hand side depicts the cost for
the marginal unit of labour (capital respectively) input. The left hand side shows the
output QL (QK) produced by this marginal unit times the resale price converted to
home currency. In optimum, the ￿rm will expand production in both plants until all
four marginal revenue-marginal cost equalities hold true.
3Now consider the e￿ects of exogenous changes of the wage rates on the equilibrium
outcome. Therefore, in addition to the assumptions above we assume the real exchange
rate R remains constant.
Considering an increase in the real home country wage rate, ￿rst focus on the e￿ects
on domestic production: a rise in W causes equation (2) to become an inequality. In
order for the equation to be in equilibrium again, the employment of factor L will have
to decrease as dQL/dL<0. Simultaneously, a decrease in L will lead to a decrease in
QK resulting in marginal cost exceeding marginal revenue in equation (3). Thus, an
increase in the home wage rate has led to a decrease in the productivity of capital in
the home country. Again, to reach an equilibrium the employment of factor K will be
reduced to increase QK. The decreased employment of K and L results in a reduction
of the home country output Q.
Due to the inverse demand function, a change in Q will a￿ect the (foreign) price
which has consequences for the optimal factor allocation in the foreign plant. Therefore,
as home output falls, price will rise.
How will this increase a￿ect foreign capital employment? Considering equation (5),








will be overcome by increasing foreign capital employment K∗ until marginal revenue
equals marginal costs. The increase in employment of capital will cause foreign labour
employment to adjust (rise) in order to ensure productive e￿ciency so that equation
(4) remains in equilibrium.
The increase in the employment of capital and labour will increase foreign output
which decreases price and brings equations (4) and (5) back to equilibrium.
Summarizing, the rise in the home real wage rate had the following consequences
(Cushman, 1987, p. 176): The employment of both capital and labour in the home
country declined leading to a reduction in the retail price (unless capital and labour are
perfect substitutes, in which case labour is merely replaced by capital leaving output
and therefore prices una￿ected). The increase in price causes an increase in the demand
for capital (and labour) in the foreign country. Hence, FDI takes place.
Symmetrically to the ￿rst case, Cushman further shows that an increase in the
foreign wage rate will lead to a decrease in FDI unless the substitutability between
capital and labour in the foreign plant is strong. That the e￿ects need to have opposite
signs is not only intuitive but also evident from the ￿rst order conditions. Consequently,
an increase in domestic productivity will deter FDI while a rise in foreign productivity
will raise FDI.
4As mentioned above, by showing that wage increases in the home country will
encourage FDI while a rise in foreign wages diminishes FDI, the model, set up in a
relatively simple neoclassical framework, provides us with some useful predictions in
which ways FDI may be a￿ected by which variables. However, like most models of FDI,
it fails to take into account all possible determinants of FDI mentioned in the literature
- for example internalization advantages. However, due to di￿culties arising from the
empirical compilation of data capturing such e￿ects, incorporating them in the model
is not a necessity in the context of this paper. Another de￿cit of the model is that
it does not incorporate transport or trade costs. We believe that is less of a problem
as the shape of transport costs di￿ers depending on the type of FDI. Market-seeking
FDI may or may not incur the shipping of intermediate goods, the same holds true
for e￿ciency-seeking FDI. And while the delivery of ￿nal goods produced for the host
country does not involve shipping costs, this may or may not be di￿erent for goods
produced for exports (market- vs. e￿ciency seeking FDI). So adding transport costs
in this simple model would not contribute much "value-added" but simply bias the
outcome in favour of FDI. Therefore we believe the framework of this simple model is
the preferable choice as a foundation for our empirical analysis.
The Main Results
We derive the following implications for the relationship of foreign direct investment
and the domestic labour market. First, location advantages are a necessary condition
for FDI. Location advantages can be lower factor prices such as labour costs. Thus,
wages are important for FDI decisions. The condition represented in equations (2)
to (5) in the model imply that a rise in domestic labour costs increases the foreign
capital stock while an increase in foreign labour costs reduces the desired employment
of capital abroad. Therefore, we derive:
Proposition 1 An increase in a country’s domestic labour costs increases the foreign
capital stock of the country’s ￿rms. A rise in foreign wages has the opposite e￿ect.
E￿ciency-seeking FDI is foremost motivated by factor price di￿erences. Thus, we
suggest:
Proposition 2 As e￿ciency-seeking FDI is aimed at exploiting factor price di￿er-
ences, we expect the foreign capital stocks created out of the e￿ciency-seeking motive
to be more elastic with respect to labour costs than the overall FDI stock.
When it comes to labour productivities, the model predicts the e￿ects of their changes
to be inverse to those of labour costs, which leads us to the following hypothesis:
Proposition 3 An increase in a country’s labour productivity diminishes the desired
foreign capital stock of the country’s ￿rms. The opposite is true for an increase in
foreign labour productivity.
5III Empirical Analysis
Relying on the model by Cushman (1987) allows us to determine a number of factors
which in￿uence the FDI decision of the ￿rm. According to Cushman (1987, p. 177),
these factors lead ￿rms to formulate a desired stock of capital in a foreign country,
which hereafter will be denoted as STOCK. The determinants derived from the pro￿t
maximizing condition (equation (1)) are the domestic and foreign labour costs, now
called DWAGE and FWAGE, the real exchange rate RER, the capital cost for do-
mestic and foreign (direct) investments, CCD and CCF, and the labour productivity
for domestic and foreign production 2, called DV A and FV A because they will be
approximated by value-added per hour worked data in the estimation.
However, Cushman argues (1987, p. 177) that in order to conduct a satisfying
econometric analysis of FDI stock or ￿ows, one needs to take other factors not resulting
from the model into account. Those variables are foreign real demand, real exchange
rate risk and a measure for the FDI-host country’s political environment regarding
foreign investors. We decide to include those variables in the following format:
• Foreign real demand will be measured by foreign Per capita-Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) which we denote as GDPCAP.
• The real exchange rate risk will be approximated by its past volatility, denoted as
RERV OL.
• The agglomeration of total foreign capital stock (by ￿rms from all countries) in
the given country as percentage of its GDP, denoted as AGGLO.
Using the right-hand side variables lacked by one period, the capital stock of domestic
￿rms in a given country j in period t + 1 can be expressed as the function:
STOCKj,t+1 = f(DWAGEt,FWAGEj,t,CCDt,
CCFj,t,RERj,t,DV At,FV Aj,t, (6)
GDPCAPj,t,RERV OLj,t,AGGLOj,t).
The Data
For the endogenous variable, the FDI stock, we use data from the Deutsche Bundes-
bank’s annual Special Statistical Publication No. 10 ("Kapitalverp￿echtung mit dem
Ausland") from 1994 to 2003. The publication provides aggregated data for direct
investment stock3 statistics at the end of a given calendar year and is broken down by
country (31 selected countries) and sector.
2From the ￿rst order conditions in equations (2) and (4) in section II.
3Minority interests (10 to 49.9 %) and controlling stakes (50 % or more) if the balance-sheet total of the investment
object exceeds ￿ve million Euro for minority interests or one million Euro for controlling interests.
6To adjust for in￿ation, we convert the data into constant (year 2000) Euro. That
yields our endogenous variable which hereafter will be referred to as STOCK for foreign
capital stock of German ￿rms in a given year in a given country.
The data sources for the exogenous variables include the International Labour Or-
ganization’s LABORSTA database (ILO, 2006), Eurostat (2006) and the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics (Banister, 2005) for the wage data, the Groningen Growth and
Development Centre (GGDC, 2006) for ￿gures on productivity and the World Devel-
opment Indicators database (WDI, 2005) for data on capital costs, FDI agglomeration,
per-capita GDP and real exchange rates 4.
Ten years (1994 to 2003) times 22 countries theoretically produces a panel data set
of 220 observation. Due to a few limitations in the availability of the data, the maxi-
mum number of observations will be 194. Therefore our panel data set is unbalanced
(meaning the number of observations for each country is not identical) 5.
Data Transformation
All variables except CCF, CCD, RER and AGGLO, the data for which is already in
the form of percentage or index points, will enter the analysis in logarithmic form to
allow the interpretation of the coe￿cients as elasticities of the foreign direct investment
stock.
To avoid multicollinearity problems steming from a high correlation between exoge-
nous variables, labour costs and value-added parameters will enter the regressions as
relative factors, i.e. we express the labour cost as the relative labour costs in the source
country in terms of the host country (DWAGE/FWAGE) and relative value-added as
DVA/FVA.
Incorporating into equation (6) we obtain
STOCKj,t+1 = f((DWAGE/FWAGE)j,t,CCDt,CCFj,t,RERj,t,
(DVA/FVA)j,t,GDPCAPj,t,RERV OLj,t,AGGLOj,t) (7)
as the new estimating equation.
In the regression analysis we use both simple ordinary least squares (OLS) and
generalized least squares (GLS). Using a two-stage least squares approach to avoid
possible problems from endogenously determined explanatory variables did not yield
results di￿ering signi￿cantly from the best of the two other estimators in terms of
magnitude or quality.
4Which we use to calculate real exchange rate volatility along the lines of Wezel (2003).
5The major limitations for the availability of the data due to missing labour cost data in the Czech Republic and




First, we regress the e￿ect of changes in relative labour costs, relative productivity,
host-country income, the real exchange rate and its volatility, FDI agglomeration as
well as domestic and foreign capital costs (all lagged by one year) on the foreign capital
stock. Level e￿ects between countries are accounted for by dummy variables. Results
of a GLS regression are reported in the ￿rst column of table 1 (regression (1)).
Most importantly, the variable of greatest interest within the context of this paper,
the relative labour costs (DWAGE/FWAGE) are not signi￿cant in that regression.
Relative value-added is signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero and negative: a one percent
increase of the German value-added per hour worked relative to foreign vaule-added
per hour worked decreases the foreign capital stock of German ￿rms in the next period
by 0.66 percent (regression (1)). This supports our proposition 3.
The foreign per-capita income is also signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent level, with the
FDI stock’s elasticity with respect to it being 1.03. The coe￿cients for AGGLO, RER,
RERV OL and CCF are insigni￿cant in regression (1) which mirrors Cushman’s re-
sults. Domestic capital costs (CCD) are found to impact the foreign FDI stock of
domestic ￿rms negatively. Broll and Wong (2006) show that minimizing the global
weighted average cost of capital is the goal of MNEs. Therefore, as long as domestic
capital costs are part of that weighted average, we would have expected them to neg-
atively impact investment. Here, the FDI stock’s elasticity with respect to domestic
capital costs is estimated at -0.13.
Returning to the relative labour costs, an Extreme Bound Analysis has shown that
they are not robust in this sample (regression (1)) as the sign of its regression coef-
￿cient changes depending on which explanatory variables are employed. Therefore,
proposition 1 cannot be con￿rmed for the whole country sample.
A reason for that may be the assumption underlying proposition 1 that the capital-
labour substitution as a consequence of rising labour costs as noted in the Cushman
model is not present - or at least does not take place greatly. If it would - and there are
signs of that happening in Germany in at least some sectors - all types of FDI might
indeed not be a￿ected by labour costs.
However, some types of FDI or some sectors surely are a￿ected by labour costs. FDI
is not only driven by location advantages but also by other factors. Especially market-
seeking FDI is rather motivated by closeness to the market or the reduction of trade
costs. This should however be di￿erent for e￿ciency-seeking FDI. Therefore, the total
panel data set analysed in regression (1) may be too diverse in the motivations and
structures of FDI leading us investigation of a subsets of the data. As we expect labour
costs to be most important for e￿ciency-seeking FDI, it must be our aim to separate
8Table 1: Country level regression results
Dependent Variable: STOCK
Regression No. (1) (2)










Fixed country e￿ects are suppressed (regression (1)). The stars imply
signi￿cance of the coe￿cients (from the t-values) at the 10(*) and 5(**)
percent level.
this type from total FDI. Before turning to an econometric analysis, we therefore got to
attempt to determine e￿ciency-seeking FDI which is motivated by the aim to reduce
production costs.
As shown in section (section II), production costs stem >from the employment of
capital and labour and therefore depend on their prices. As in the case of FDI ￿nanced
in the source-country, the cost of capital may be almost identical for all potential host
countries, it makes sense to focus on labour costs. Firms wishing to save on labour
costs will engage in e￿ciency-seeking FDI in countries with relatively lower labour costs
compared to Germany. In order to create a subset of the full data set, we need to chose a
number of countries with labour costs below Germany’s (i.e. FWAGE/DWAGE < 1).
To further reduce the sample we chose a treshold of 1/3, i.e. labour costs in the
host country being no greater than one third of German labour costs. This reduces
the original panel to six countries and creates a subset of nations with labour costs
signi￿cantly di￿ering from the rest of the 22 countries. Our sub panel analysed in this
section consist of China, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Malaysia and South
Korea which we identi￿ed as potential host countries for (mainly) e￿ciency-seeking
FDI by German ￿rms. Results of a seperate OLS regression are also reported in table
1 (regression (2)).
Contrary to regression (1), relative domestic labour costs ( DWAGE/FWAGE) are
now signi￿cant and match our expectations in terms of sign. (Furthermore, an EBA
now con￿rms the relative labour costs to be robust and signi￿cant at the 10 percent
level.) The elasticity is estimated at 0.76 indicating that a one percent increase of
German labour costs relative to the host country labour costs c.p. increases the FDI
stock of German ￿rms in that low labour cost country by 0.76 percent. This con￿rms
proposition 2.
9Furthermore, the elasticity of the FDI stock with respect to relative productivity
(DVA/FVA) is higher in absolute terms (-1.70) towards the low labour cost countries
than towards all countries (regression (1)) and equally signi￿cant. (As in regressions
(1), its negative sign con￿rms proposition 3.) If we conclude from proposition 2 that
the FDI stock’s higher elasticity in absolute terms cannot only be expected for relative
labour costs but also for relative productivity, we have that conclusion con￿rmed by
regression (2) vs. (1) as | − 1.70| > | − 0.66|.
GDPCAP (3.21) and CCD (-0.17) also have the same coe￿cient signs and signif-
icance levels for the reduced country sample. Additionally, the foreign capital costs
(CCF) and the agglomeration variable (AGGLO) are also positive and signi￿cant in
regression (2). While the latter results meets our expectations, there seems to be no
explanation in the literature as to why host country capital costs should positively
in￿uence FDI stocks of foreign ￿rms in that country. One explanation may be that
the FDI stock is highly correlated with host country economic growth, which in case
of high growth (economic boom) may raise the price of capital in the host country.
The exchange rate volatility (RERV OL) is, compared to regression (1), signi￿cant
in regression (2), albeit only at the ten percent level. That the coe￿cient is positive
seems to com￿rm the view of Sung and Lapan (2000) that exchange rate volatility
creates an opportunity to shift production to lower-cost plants. Thus, high volatility
increases the value of that option and therefore the value of FDI, which increases the
incentive to invest abroad.
The ￿ndings in this section therefore support proposition 2. An increase in relative
domestic labour costs leads to an increase of the e￿ciency-seeking FDI capital stock
of German ￿rms in that country. The opposite is true for relative domestic labour
productivity (as the FDI stock’s elasticity with respect to relative (domestic) value
added per hour worked is negative) which again, like the ￿ndings of regression (1),
supports proposition 3.
Sector Level
Proposition 2 from page 5 also allows sectoral predictions as it implies market-seeking
FDI is not mainly motivated by factor price di￿erences. Instead it is driven by the
aim to reduce the costs of trade. Therefore, we can expect market-seeking FDI to be
relatively more important in sectors with high trade costs such as services industries
and relatively less important in sectors with lower trade costs such as tradeable goods.
This section will analyse the determinants of FDI in three sectors: motor vehicles,
sale & maintenance of consumer goods and banking. Due to the limited availability of
sectoral data, we have to reduce the GLS regressions to 11 countries 6. The results are
6Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United
States.
10reported in table 2.
Table 2: Sector level regression results
Dependent Variable: STOCK
Number of observations: 88
Method: GLS
Sector: Motor vehicles Sale & Maintenance Banking
Regression No. (3) (4) (5)
DWAGE/FWAGE 1.038** -0.374* 0.353
DVA/FVA -0.227** 0.146 -0.704**
GDPCAP 3.008** 2.531** 5.302**
RERVOL -0.359** 0.227** 0.555**
RER 0.013** 0.004 -0.011
CCD -0.008 -0.111** -0.174**
CCF 0.010 0.018** 0.079**
AGGLO 0.001** 0.000** 0.000
R2 0.944 0.983 0.931
Fixed country e￿ects are suppressed. Standard errors were calculated using White’s heteroscedas-
ticity-consistent standard errors. Signi￿cance levels of 10(*) and 5(**) percent as before.
Comparing the regression results for the motor vehicle (3), sale & maintenance (4)
and banking (5) sectors in table 2 it is obvious that the relative labour costs are not
equally signi￿cant for the FDI stock in the three sectors. Speci￿cally, they only seem
to be signi￿cant (at the ￿ve percent level) in the motor vehicle industry where the
elasticity of the German FDI stock with respect to relative labour costs is estimated
at 1.04. This matches our expectations as proposition 2 suggests that the FDI is
most elastic with respect to labour costs for e￿ciency-seeking FDI. E￿ciency-seeking
FDI is more likely where trade costs are low as it often involves the transport of
￿nal goods. Therefore, e￿ciency-seeking FDI is almost impossible in services such
as sales & maintenance (4) where the regression coe￿cient for DWAGE/FWAGE is
actually negative (-0.37) but of low signi￿cance. For banking, we estimate a positive
but insigni￿cant elasticity for the FDI stock with respect to relative labour costs.
The relative productivity coe￿cients match expectations from proposition 3 for the
motor vehicle (3) and banking (5) sectors but appear to be insigni￿cant for sales &
maintenance FDI. That seems intuitive as this is a service sector where the productivity
of services in a foreign country should not have any in￿uence on investments.
Unsurprinsingly, as in the previous regressions, the FDI stock’s elasticity with re-
spect to host country income (GDPCAP) is found to be highest in absolute values
and highly signi￿cant for all three sectors. Interestingly, between sectors it is highest
for banking (5.30) which suggests that FDI in that sector is more dependent on the
incomes of host-country inhabitants than, say, in the sales and maintenance sector
(where the elasticity is 2.53). Another major di￿erence between sectors stems from the
RERV OL coe￿cient which is negative and signi￿cant for motor verhicles and positive
11and signi￿cant for the other two sectors. This con￿rms the di￿erent theories/￿ndings
of previous papers for the same variable (Cushman (1987), Bloningen (2005), Sung
and Lapan (2000)) depending on the type of FDI as some of them take place to limit
exchange rate uncertainty (market-seeking FDI) while e￿ciency-seeking FDI may be
hampered by uncertainity. Broll and Zilcha (1992) also emphasis the importance of
currency-future markets to insure against volatility. Their presence stimulates FDI
while the degree of the ￿rm’s risk aversion is the important factor in their absence.
The capital cost coe￿ents do not di￿er in terms of sign and signi￿cance from the
￿ndings in the previous regressions while the AGGLO variable appears not to alter the
FDI stock signi￿cantly.
Furthermore, it can be concluded that there is a sector pattern in the foreign direct
investment capital stock of ￿rms. Manufacturing FDI seems to be more sensitive to
relative labour costs than service and banking sector FDI.
We have shown that labour costs do a￿ect foreign direct investment decisions by
German multinationals - but not for all types of FDI into all countries. Rising labour
costs increase the FDI stock in sectors where ￿nal goods are tradable and in countries
where labour costs di￿er signi￿cantly from Germany - two characteristics associated
with e￿ciency-seeking FDI.
One may argue that our analysis only considers relative labour costs and that due
to a convergion of wages internationally (as a consequence of factor price equalization),
German relative labour costs can hardly rise compared to the low labour cost countries
identi￿ed for regression (2) as wages are rising more quickly in these countries. For ex-
ample between 1996 and 2002, German relative per-hour labour cost did indeed decline
by 33 percent compared with the unweighted average of these six countries. However,
productivity increases in low labour cost countries need to be taken into account. The
decline in German relative value-added per hour worked was relatively higher (43 per-
cent) than its relative wage decline. Those foreign productivity increases therefore lead
to relatively higher FDI stocks by German ￿rms, especially as the elasticity of the FDI
stock with respect to productivity was found to be higher (than with respect to labour
costs) throughout our regressions.
V Summary
The model presented in this paper indicates the pattern of the labour cost-foreign direct
investment relationship. Unless substitution between capital and labour is strong, an
increase in domestic labour costs relative to foreign labour costs will in theory increase
the FDI stock in that foreign country and vice versa. On the other hand, relative
domestic productivity rises will diminish the FDI stock.
12We derived three propositions. An increase in domestic labour costs increases FDI.
This e￿ects is stronger for e￿ciency-seeking foreign investments. And domestic produc-
tivity increases have a contrary impact. The latter two were con￿rmed in the empirical
part of our paper while a general statement (￿rst proposition) predicting an increase
in the FDI stock when domestic labour costs rise cannot be endorsed. A reason for
that could be the substitution of labour by capital as an alternative to FDI (for some
types of FDI) in some sectors.
Our econometric analysis shows that it is important to distinguish FDI regarding its
motiation. While investments aimed at capturing a foreign market are less dependent
on labour cost di￿erentials, FDI targeting cost reductions (e￿ciency-seeking FDI) is
more sensitive to labour costs. In a regression of the FDI stock of German ￿rms
in six low labour cost countries, we ￿nd that the elasticity of that FDI stock with
respect to relative domestic labour costs is 0.76. The elasticity of the FDI stock in
all 22 countries in our panel with respect to relative labour costs is not found to be
signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero. On a sector level, we ￿nd a positive elasticity for the
automobile industry (tradable good) and no consistent coe￿cient for banking and sale
& maintenance sectors. That con￿rms that service sector FDI may be mainly aimed at
capturing a foreign market and is therefore inelastic with respect to (domestic) labour
costs, which is not the case for manufacturing FDI possibly targeted at producing
goods for exports. All the regressions however show that the FDI stock is most elastic
with respect to variables other than relative labour costs. These are host country per-
capita income (positive elasticity) and relative source country productivity (negative
relationship). The latter one also explains the increased FDI ￿ows out of Germany
in the last decade because although German labour costs have fallen relative to low
labour cost countries, relative German productivity has declined at a much faster pace.
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